Opinion: The Dutch Election and Its Impact on Europe’s Future

By the Centre for European Reform
Guest Authors: Armida van Rij and Sander Tordoir

Editor’s Note

The Netherlands Chamber of Commerce Australia is pleased to share this guest opinion piece from the Centre for European Reform (CER), one of Europe’s leading independent think tanks. This article, authored by Armida van Rij and Sander Tordoir, explores what the recent Dutch parliamentary election means for the Netherlands and for Europe more broadly.

Reproduced with permission from the Centre for European Reform.

The Far-Right’s Staying Power in Dutch Politics

By Armida van Rij, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for European Reform

The Netherlands has experienced one of its closest and most consequential elections in decades. After just eleven months in power, the coalition government of the far-right Freedom Party (PVV) and the populist Farmers Party (BBB) collapsed, forcing Dutch voters back to the polls for the third time in five years.

The results appeared, at first glance, to signal a win for moderation. D66, led by Rob Jetten, gained ground with an optimistic campaign message, sharing top position with the PVV at 26 seats each. Yet a closer look shows that the far-right’s influence has not receded—it has consolidated.

Support for other far-right parties such as JA21 and Forum for Democracy (FvD) increased, offsetting PVV losses. Together, these parties now command 42 seats—more than a quarter of parliament—up from 28 seats in 2021. The trend is unmistakable: far-right ideas are becoming embedded in mainstream Dutch politics.

Policy language once confined to the far-right is now commonplace. Even centre-left parties such as the Greens/Labour (GL/PvdA) have adopted PVV-style rhetoric on immigration, referring to an “asylum problem.” While most major parties have ruled out formal coalitions with the PVV, they have not resisted its policy influence. Parliamentary motions proposed by far-right parties are now routinely co-sponsored or supported by centrist groups, including the VVD.

Although D66 emerged as the election’s “winner,” its ability to govern will depend on forming a fragile multi-party coalition. A potential partnership between D66, VVD, GL/PvdA and the Christian Democrats (CDA) would hold a majority in both chambers, but ideological divisions remain deep. VVD leader Dylan Yeşilgöz has publicly rejected working with GL/PvdA, creating pressure for D66 to consider compromises that could include JA21.

The message from this election is clear: the Netherlands has not reversed the rise of the far-right—it has normalised it. Unless centrist parties redefine the political narrative and refocus debate on governance, inclusion and European cooperation, far-right ideas will continue to shape Dutch policy for years to come.

The Dutch Election and Europe’s Strategic Autonomy

By Sander Tordoir, Chief Economist, Centre for European Reform

The Dutch election matters well beyond The Hague. After two years of political drift, the result offers a narrow path to a government that could restore the Netherlands’ traditional leadership role in Europe.

Under the previous government, the Netherlands was often absent - or obstructive - on key European initiatives. It opposed additional EU funding for rearmament, resisted reforms to fiscal rules and clashed with Germany on economic policy. For one of Europe’s most trade-oriented economies, such isolation was costly.

A stable, centrist Dutch government could change that. The Netherlands is now the eurozone’s largest economy outside the “big four,” with GDP nearing half that of Italy and a world-leading technology sector anchored by ASML, NXP, Adyen and Booking. Sound domestic policy could boost productivity and help revitalise Europe’s single market.

Dutch leadership is also crucial for Europe’s industrial and security strategy. The Netherlands sits at the heart of Europe’s semiconductor supply chain. It faces difficult choices over export controls to China—choices that balance economic interests, technological sovereignty and transatlantic relations.

If the Dutch government invests in research, education and skilled migration, it can sustain Europe’s competitiveness in semiconductors and advanced manufacturing. With public debt at just 43 per cent of GDP, the Netherlands also has room to expand defence spending and anchor Europe’s rearmament alongside Germany, Poland and the Nordics.

Historically, Dutch governments have been pragmatic bridge-builders within the EU, mediating between France’s push for strategic autonomy and the fiscal conservatism of northern Europe. Reclaiming that role will be essential as the EU prepares for the next budget cycle and new challenges in technology, defence and global trade.

The Dutch election is therefore not only a test of domestic stability but also a measure of Europe’s ability to act collectively in an uncertain world. A capable, outward-looking Dutch government could once again give Europe the balance and leadership it urgently needs.

About the Centre for European Reform

The Centre for European Reform (CER) is an independent think tank based in London, Brussels and Berlin, dedicated to making the European Union work better and strengthening its role in the world. Learn more at cer.eu.

This article is published by the Netherlands Chamber of Commerce Australia with permission from the Centre for European Reform and the authors.